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ABSTRACT 
 
  Investor groups in both Canada and the U.S. have petitioned the Ontario Securities 
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue statements clarifying the 
application of existing disclosure requirements to climate change-related risks. Even if issuers 
are meeting their current obligations with respect to disclosure of climate change risks, however, 
the “materiality” threshold for disclosure would likely leave a gap between what issuers are 
required to disclose under the law and what interested investors would like to know about how 
issuers are responding to the challenges posed by climate change. This is due to the fact that if an 
issuer has determined that climate change will not have a material impact on its financial results, 
it is under no obligation to disclose its reasons for reaching this conclusion. Investors interested 
in environmentally-responsible investing, however, may want to know these reasons. It may be 
relevant to their investment decisions, for example, whether the reason is because the issuer has 
already reduced its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, rather than because it has purchased 
carbon credits on the futures market which it can use to meet any regulatory limits on emissions 
the government may seek to impose. But it does not necessarily follow that mandatory disclosure 
under securities regulation is the most appropriate way to fill this gap. A preferable approach 
might be for voluntary disclosure regimes, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), to fill 
this gap. Although take-up by corporations of the GRI standard for disclosure has been slow, 
environmental reporting in compliance with the standard can provide interested investors with 
credible and comparable information.
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THE MATERIALITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE 
 
BY GAIL E. HENDERSON* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
While North American national governments demonstrate an ongoing reluctance to pass 
climate change legislation, investors in Canada and the U.S. are pressing issuers and regulators 
for more and better disclosure on climate-change related risks.1 Canadian investors most recently 
expressed their concerns to the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) during its 2009 corporate 
sustainability reporting initiative.2 In an earlier staff notice, the OSC expressed its own concerns 
regarding the level of issuer compliance with environmental disclosure obligations.3 Both the 
Canadian Securities Administrators and the Securities and Exchange Commission have 
responded to this pressure with “guidance” to issuers on their environmental reporting 
obligations under existing securities disclosure laws.4 
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* S.J.D. Candidate, University of Toronto, gail.henderson@utoronto.ca.  
1 Letter from E. Ellmen, SIO, to J. Matear and N. Varma (21 April 2008), online: SIO 
<http://www.socialinvestment.ca/documents/OSCEnvironmentalReportingStaffNoticeApril081.pdf>; California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System, et al., “Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure” 
(18 September 2007), online: Investor Network on Climate Risk <http://www.incr.com//Document.Doc?id=187>  
[SEC Petition].  
2 Ontario Securities Commission, OSC corporate sustainability reporting initiative: Report to Minister of Finance 
(December 18, 2009 at 10), online: OSC, <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
Category5/rule_20091218_51-717_mof-rpt.pdf> [OSC, “2009 Report”]. Although investors want the OSC to play a 
greater role in “promoting” environmental disclosure, they generally were of the opinion that this did not require 
“expanding existing disclosure requirements.” Ibid. at 10 and 15. 
#!Environmental Reporting, O.S.C. Staff Notice 51-716 (2008) 21 OSCB 2223 (29 February 2008) at 2223 [OSC, 
Environmental Reporting]. See also OSC, “2009 Report”, ibid. at 15; Jason Scott Johnston, “Signalling Social 
Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance” (2005) 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-16 at 8, online: 
SSRN, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=725103>.!
4!Environmental Reporting Guidance, CSA Staff Notice 51-333 (October 27, 2010) at 5, online: OSC, 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/csa_20101027_51-333_environmental-
reporting.pdf> [CSA Staff Notice 51-333]; SEC, Interpretive Release: Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure 
Related to Climate Change, Release No. 33-9106 (February 2, 2010) at 27, online: SEC, 
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf>. The Canadian Performance Reporting Board of the Chartered 
Accountants of Canada has also attempted to clarify issuers’ responsibilities with respect to climate change 
disclosure: Canadian Performance Reporting Board, Discussion Brief, “MD&A Disclosure About the Financial 
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Even if issuers were to comply fully with their current obligations to disclose climate 
change-related risks, a gap would remain between what issuers are required to disclose under 
securities law and what some investors would like to know about how issuers are responding to 
the challenges posed by climate change. This is because issuers are required to disclose only 
“material” risks. The ongoing uncertainty around future climate change-related legislation and 
the timing and extent of predicted physical impacts of climate change makes it difficult for 
issuers to determine whether these are reasonably likely to have a material effect on their 
financial results. Furthermore, if an issuer has determined that climate change will not have a 
material impact on its financial results, they are under no obligation to disclose their reasons for 
reaching this conclusion. Environmentally-responsible investors or institutional investors 
concerned with long-term, economy-wide risks of climate change5 may want to know these 
reasons, however. It may be relevant to their investment decisions, for example, whether the 
reason is because the issuer has already taken positive actions to reduce their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions versus protecting the company’s bottom line by purchasing carbon credits on 
the futures market which it can use to meet any future regulatory limits on carbon emissions, 
should they ever be imposed.  
The materiality threshold for disclosure under securities regulation, therefore, may leave 
out information pertinent to some investors about a company’s environmental performance. One 
solution is to require all companies to report on their environmental performance. This raises 
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Impact of Climate Change and Other Environmental Issues” (14 October 2005), online: Chartered Accountants of 
Canada, 
<http://www.cica.ca/multimedia/Download_Library/Research_Guidance/MDandA_Business_Reporting/English/E_
CPRB_Discussion_Brief_2005.pdf> [CICA Brief], updated in “Building a Better MD&A: Climate Change 
Disclosures”, online: Chartered Accountants of Canada, <http://www.cica.ca/research-and-guidance/mda-and-
business-reporting/mda-publications/item12846.pdf>.!
5 Some scholars have described large institutional investors as “universal” investors on the basis that their portfolios 
reflect the market as a whole and therefore they are more concerned (or ought to be) with issues that can affect the 
economy as a whole, such as climate change, than with individual company performance. See James P. Hawley & 
Andrew T. Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). 
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important policy questions, however, as to what information companies ought to disclose, in 
what format and how frequently, and whether securities law is the most appropriate avenue 
through which to impose such a requirement.6 In any event, legislation mandating environmental 
reporting beyond the materiality threshold is unlikely to come any time soon: provincial 
securities regulators are currently preoccupied with the fight over the constitutionality of the 
proposed national securities regulator and enhanced environmental disclosure.7 Nor does the 
proposed national securities act make any mention of mandatory environmental disclosure.8 In 
the meantime, it is relevant to ask whether voluntary disclosure in accordance with an 
international voluntary disclosure standard, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), might 
fulfill some of the objectives of mandatory disclosure and fill the gap in environmental 
information desired by some investors left by continuous disclosure obligations under securities 
law. I argue that the GRI’s G3 Guidelines for voluntary reporting of environmental information 
does both and therefore concerned investors should turn their attention to encouraging companies 
to disclose in accordance with this standard. This article does not delve into the well-covered 
debate about the role of mandatory or voluntary disclosure as a tool of environmental regulation 
in changing corporation’s behaviour towards the natural environment, nor the possible value of 
disclosure provided by the GRI and CDP to the public at large.9 
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6 Not to mention the responsibility of corporations for the environmental impacts of their operations and the 
compatibility of the current profit-maximization objective of the corporation with the concept of sustainable 
development. These issues are the focus of my SJD dissertation.  
7 A reference to the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of the proposed federal act was heard by the 
Court on April 13, 2011; the decision is pending. 
8 Proposed Canadian Securities Act, online: Department of Finance, <http://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-lvm-
eng.htm>. Arguably this is a matter to be dealt with through regulations made under the Act: see s. 227(v) of the 
proposed act.  
9 On this topic generally, see, e.g., David W Case, “Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational 
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective” (2005) 76 U Colo L Rev 379 at 391; Bradley C Karkkainen, 
“Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?” 
(2001) 89 Geo L J 257. 
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Part II summarizes the current Canadian disclosure requirements under which issuers 
might be required to disclose climate change-related information and discusses the materiality 
threshold for disclosure. This summary integrates the recent guidance from the Canadian 
Securities Administrators (CSA) on environmental disclosure. Part III reviews the main climate-
change-related risks facing issuers, examines the difficulty in applying the materiality threshold 
to these risks and explains the “gap” in disclosure that would remain even if all issuers were 
accurately determining and disclosing their material climate change-related risks. Part IV first 
reviews some of the emerging international voluntary disclosure standards, including the GRI 
and the Carbon Disclosure Project. I then evaluate these standards in light of the advantages and 
disadvantages of mandatory and voluntary reporting.  
II. CURRENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
In Canada, there are two mandatory continuous disclosure documents in which issuers 
could be required to make climate change-related disclosure: the annual information form or 
“AIF”; and the management discussion and analysis or “MD&A”, which must accompany all 
annual and interim financial statements.10 
The required contents of the AIF are set out in Form 51-102F2. The AIF should contain 
“material information related to the issuer”, rather than to the general state of the economy.11 
Item 5 is a description of the business. This description must include the “effects of 
environmental protection”, specifically “[t]he financial and operational effects of environmental 
protection requirements on the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of [the] 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Continuous Disclosure Obligations, O.S.C., NI 51-102 (4 July 2008), ss. 6.1 (AIF) and 5.1 (MD&A), online: 
Ontario Securities Commission 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20080704_51-102_unofficial-cons-ni.pdf>  
[NI 51-102]. 
11 David L. Johnston & Kathleen Doyle Rockwell, Canadian Securities Regulation, 4th ed (Markham, ON: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2006) at 206. See NI 51-102, ibid., Form 51-102F2, Part 1, (a): “Your AIF describes your 
company, its operations and prospects, risks and other external factors that impact your company specifically.” 
[Emphasis added.] 
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company in the current financial year and the expected effect in future years.”12 The recent 
guidance from the CSA explains that issuers should include information on the costs associated 
with compliance, “anticipated trends in respect of these costs, and the potential impact of these 
costs on the issuer’s financial and operational results.”13 
Issuers are also required to include a description of any social or environmental policies 
considered “fundamental” to the issuer’s operations.14 The recent CSA guidance on 
environmental disclosure instructs issuers to construe “policy” broadly to include policies on 
“sustainable development, community relations, the use and disposal of toxic or otherwise 
hazardous materials, prevention of spills, recycling, conservation of water and the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions.”15 The description “may include a quantification of the costs 
associated with the policies!where quantitative information is reasonably available 
and would provide meaningful information to investors.”16 Finally, section 5.2 requires 
disclosure of “risk factors” and expressly mentions environmental risks.17  
Disclosure of risks is also required in the MD&A. Form 51-102F1 instructs that MD&A 
should discuss “material information that may not be fully reflected in the financial statements” 
and “important trends and risks that have affected the financial statements, and trends and risks 
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12 NI 51-102, ibid., Form 51-102F2, s. 5.1(1)(k). This requirement also applies to long-form prospectuses: see 
General Prospectus Requirements and Related Amendments (Final), O.S.C., NI 41-101 (2008) 31 OSCB Issue 10 
(Supp-2) (7 March 2008), Form 41-101F1, Item 5 [NI 41-101]. SEC Regulation S-K, Item 101 contains a similar 
requirement: see Oren Perez, “Facing the Global Hydra: Ecological Transformation at the Global Financial Frontier 
– The Ambitious Case of the Global Reporting Initiative” (2006) Bar-Ilan University Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 06-9 at 12 (SSRN).  
13 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 15. 
14 NI 51-102, supra note 10, Form 51-102F2, s. 5.1(4). The U.K. similarly requires disclosure of environmental 
matters only “to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the 
company's business”: Companies Act 2006, c. 46, s. 417(5).  
15 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 16. 
16 Ibid. 
17 This is also a required long-form prospectus item: see NI 41-101, supra note 12, Form 41-101F1, Item 21. 
! '!
that are reasonably likely to affect them in the future”.18 Specifically, issuers are required to 
disclose “known trends, demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that are reasonably 
likely to have an effect on [the] business”19 and “commitments, events, risks or uncertainties that 
[the issuer] reasonably believe[s] will materially affect [the] company’s future performance”.20 
The recent CSA guidance notes that “[t]here is no specified future time period that must be 
considered in assessing the impact of a known trend or uncertainty”; rather, the time period will 
depend on the particularities of both the issuer and trend or uncertainty in question.21  
All of these disclosure requirements are qualified, however, by the “materiality” 
threshold. The OSC has stated that “materiality is the determining factor for including 
information in [continuous disclosure] documents.”22 Forms 51-102F2 and 51-102F1 instruct 
issuers to focus on “material” information, and to “exercise [their] judgement” in determining 
whether or not information is material.23 The definition of “material” to be applied to both the 
AIF and MD&A is “[w]ould a reasonable investor’s decision whether or not to buy, sell or hold 
securities in [the] company likely be influenced or changed if the information in question was 
omitted or misstated?”24 
Over the years, courts and securities commissions have attempted to interpret and give 
meaning to the “elusive” concept of materiality.25 Of course, in the hands of the courts, the 
determination as to whether a given fact was “material” and therefore ought to have been 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 NI 51-102, supra note 10, Form 51-102F1, Part 1 (a). Form 51-102F1 should also include discussion of any 
material asset retirement obligations: CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 14. A completed Form 51-102F1 
must also be included in a long-form prospectus: see NI 41-101, ibid., Form 41-101F1, Item 8. SEC Regulation S-K, 
Item 303 contains a similar requirement: see Perez, supra note 12 at 13.  
19 NI 51-102, ibid., Form 51-102F1, s. 1.2. 
20 Ibid., Form 51-102F1, s. 1.4(g). 
21 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 11. 
22 OSC, Environmental Reporting, supra note 3 at 2223. See also CSA Staff Notice 51-333 at 5. 
23 NI 51-102, supra note 10, Form 51-102F2, Part 1 (d) and Form 51-102F1, Part 1 (e). 
24!Ibid.,!Form 51-102F2, Part 1 (e) and Form 51-102F1, Part 1 (f). See also OSC, “2009 Report”, supra note 2 at 14. 
25 Homer Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose (New York: Law & 
Business, Inc., 1979) at 42.  
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disclosed is “an ex post facto judgement”.26 It is much more difficult for issuers “to specify ex 
ante what types of information are [material] without engaging in overkill.”27 
In the YBM case,28 the OSC noted that assessing materiality is “not a science” and 
“involves the exercise of judgement and common sense.”29 The Commission reiterated that the 
proper test for materiality “is one of market impact” from the perspective of the investor as an 
“economic being”.30 In other words, materiality is to be assessed from the point of view of an 
investor concerned with the “market price or value” of the security.31 With respect to future 
events, the Commission cited the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson 
for the proposition that the potential effect on the market price had to be discounted by the 
chances of it occurring.32 The Commission went on to find that even where probability cannot be 
determined with certainty, a fact may still meet the test for materiality “when the broader factual 
context suggests a risk faced by an issuer.”33 
In Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., the Supreme Court of Canada held that the “business 
judgement rule” has no application to disclosure requirements.34 The business judgement rule is 
applied by courts in reviewing decisions of the board of directors and states that courts will not 
interfere with decisions that fall within a “range of reasonableness”.35 In Kerr, the Court stated 
that “while forecasting is a matter of business judgement, disclosure is a matter of legal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ibid. at 22. 
27 Paul G Mahoney, “Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems” (1995) 62 U Chicago L Rev 1047 at 
1094. 
28 In the Matter of YBM Magnex International Inc. (2003), 26 OSCB 5285 [YBM]. 
29 Ibid. at para. 90. 
30 Ibid. at para. 91. 
31 Ibid. This is similar to the approach taken by the International Accounting Standards Board and the U.S. Supreme 
Court: see Perez, supra note 12 at 9-10. 
32 YBM, ibid. at 92. 
33 Ibid. at 101. 
34 2007 SCC 44, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 331 at para. 55. 
35 Ibid. at para. 54, citing Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp. (1998), 42 OR (3d) 177 (CA). 
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obligation.”36 Determining “materiality”, however, requires an “exercise [of] judgement”37 and 
courts likely will find themselves without the expertise to second-guess management’s 
materiality judgements with respect to climate change, except in those cases that fall outside the 
“range of reasonableness.” 
There is some evidence that the type of information considered relevant by “reasonable 
investors” is evolving to include environmental factors. A number of large Canadian pension 
funds have “responsible investing” policies that discuss the relevance of a potential portfolio 
company’s environmental performance to their investment decision-making.38 The OSC Report 
to the Minister on its corporate sustainability reporting initiative quotes from the CFA Institute’s 
2008 paper “Environmental, Social and Governance Factors at Listed Companies: A Manual for 
Investors” that “[a] growing number of investors...share the view that a prudent investor ought to 
consider ESG [environmental, social and governance] issues in his or her analysis because these 
factors can have an impact on investment performance.”39 Although issues of environmental 
performance and disclosure are attracting increasing attention in the investment community, it is 
not clear that this concern is affecting where the majority of investors put their money. In other 
words, it is not clear that a company’s overall environmental performance is currently 
influencing investors’ decisions to buy, sell or hold a security. This recent attention, therefore, 
does not appear to represent a real shift in the definition of “reasonable investor” as an 
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36 Ibid. at para. 54. 
37 Supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
38 See, e.g., Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, “Policy on Responsible Investing”, August 2010 at 1, online: 
CPPIB, <http://www.cppib.ca/files/PDF/Responsible_Investing_Policy_August2010.pdf>: “Responsible corporate 
behaviour with respect to environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors can generally have a positive 
influence on long-term financial performance, recognizing that the importance of ESG factors varies across 
industries, geography and time”. See also Caisse, “Policy on Socially Responsible Investment” at 1, online: Caisse, 
<http://www.lacaisse.com/en/gouvernance/Documents/politique_investissement_responsable_en.pdf>; OMERS, 
Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures – Primary Plan at 6, online: OMERS, 
<http://www.omers.ca/pdf/SIPandP.pdf>. The extent to which these policies are implemented in actual investment 
decision-making is an issue I explore in a draft paper presented at the 14th Berlin Roundtables on Transnationality: 
Financialization and Everyday Life, Berlin, June 25-29, 2011. 
39 OSC, “2009 Report”, supra note 2 at 14. 
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“economic being”: environmental factors are taken into account only insofar as they might 
impact an issuer’s bottom line.40 And so long as investors are not basing investment decisions on 
environmental performance environmental factors are unlikely to have a “material” effect on 
issuers’ financial results, except in extreme circumstances, such as the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion and oil spill. This is not to suggest that there are not very good reasons for investors to 
consider environmental factors in making investment decisions for reasons apart from their 
impact on expected returns, but rather that if there is a shift in investor behaviour, it may be less 
profound than some might hope.41 For this reason, the materiality threshold still strictly limits the 
environmental information that an issuer is required to disclose under existing securities law. The 
next section explores in more detail the limit on disclosure imposed by the materiality threshold. 
III. THE MATERIALITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
A. Application of the Materiality Threshold to the Main Categories of Risk Posed by Climate 
Change 
 
There is general agreement that the climate is warming as a result of human activity.42 
The risks posed by climate change fall broadly into two main categories: physical risks and 
regulatory risks.43 There is also a risk that governments or environmental groups will attempt to 
hold large emitters liable for the effects of climate change through litigation.44 Although it is 
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40 See, e.g., CPPIB, Policy on Responsible Investing, supra note 38 at 1. 
41 There is a small, but not insignificant market in North America for “ethical funds” that screen investments based 
on ethical criteria, including environmental factors. Canada’s “social responsible investing” market was estimated at 
over 600 billion CAD in 2008, representing 19.9% of assets under management in Canada: Social Investment 
Organization, “Canadian Socially Responsible Investment Review 2008” (March 2009) at 5, online: SIO, 
<http://www.socialinvestment.ca/documents/caReview2008.pdf>.  
42 See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, Stern Review on the economics of climate change, Chapter 1 at 6-7, online: National 
Archives, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm>. 
43 SEC Petition, supra note 1 at 22. 
44 Andrew Schatz, “Regulating Greenhouse Gases by Mandatory Information Disclosure” (2008) 26 Va Envtl LJ 
335 at 362. CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 8 also discusses “reputation” and “business model” risk. The 
latter includes things such as “decreased demand for goods that have a negative impact on the environment or fail to 
meet customer standards.”: CSA Staff Notice 51-333 at 10. 
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evident that climate change constitutes a trend or risk reasonably likely to affect issuers in the 
future,45 determining the materiality of that risk is another matter. 
The predicted effects of climate change include, among other things, the “availability of 
water”; the “productivity of farms, forests and fisheries”; and the “prevalence of oppressive heat 
and humidity” which, in turn, will impact costs related to “engineered environments” such as 
office buildings.46 It is predicted that rising global temperatures will cause sea levels to rise,47 
which will “not only encroach directly on existing infrastructures but also accelerate the rates of 
coastal erosion, increase the damage due to storm surges, and contaminate coastal aquifers with 
salt water.”48 There is also evidence that climate change will cause, or is already causing, an 
increased number of both floods and droughts.49 These physical impacts pose risks to businesses’ 
assets, operations and markets.50 The recent CSA guidance provides a list of specific examples of 
such risks, including property damage, disruptions to operations and increased insurance claims 
and premiums.51 
Whether these predicted effects will occur, and, if so, when, is still uncertain. The United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is considered the authoritative 
voice on climate change. The IPCC has expressed “very high confidence” of increased risk of 
flood due to the rise in sea level, but only “medium confidence” that global warming will affect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 SEC Petition, supra note 1 at 28-29. 
46 John P. Holdren, “Global Climatic Disruption: Risks and Opportunities”, Presentation to the Investor Summit on 
Climate Risk (New York, 14 February 2008) at 5, online: Ceres, <http://www.ceres.org//Document.Doc?id=282>. 
47 Ibid. at 23, 30; Stern, supra note 42, Chapter 1 at 15-16.  
48 Vaclav Smil, Global Catastrophes and Trends: The Next Fifty Years (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008) at 
182. 
49 Holdren, supra note 46 at 17, 28; Stern, supra note 42, Chapter 1 at 15. 
50 Holdren, ibid. at 55. 
51 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 9. 
! *"!
crop productivity.52 How much sea levels are expected to rise is also uncertain. The IPCC 
predicts an increase between 18 and 59 cm during the twenty-first century, but “[n]arrowing the 
estimates of future sea level rise is extremely difficult.”53 Smil sums up the difficulties in 
predicting the specifics of climate change impacts this way: “even our most complex models are 
only elaborate speculations.”54 It is likewise impossible for an issuer to quantify with any level of 
accuracy the risk of property damage, disruption or increased insurance costs due to climate 
change in order to determine the materiality of these risks for the purpose of disclosure. Until 
these risks can be quantified with more certainty, any disclosure under existing requirements 
would have to be so vague and general, rather than firm-specific, as to be meaningless to 
investors. 
Even if issuers could determine with any level of accuracy the reasonably likely effects of 
climate change on its financial results, the question remains whether a “reasonable investor” 
would consider possible physical impacts 50-100 years in the future55 “material” today? In its 
recent guidance, the CSA notes that the time horizon of a trend or uncertainty “may be relevant” 
to determining its materiality.56 There are very good reasons for investors to take the possible 
impacts of climate change into account in making investment decisions, particularly for large 
institutional investors, such as public-sector pension funds with liabilities stretching generations 
into the future,57 but it is not clear that these possible future impacts currently are affecting 
decisions to buy, sell or hold a particular security, having regard to the investor as an “economic 
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52 IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report” at 48, online: IPCC, <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf>. The IPCC defines “very high confidence” as 9 out of 10 and “medium confidence” as 5 
out of 10: see ibid. at 27. 
53 Smil, supra note 48 at 182. 
54 Ibid. at 180. 
55 See Holdren, supra note 46 at 23-30; IPCC, supra note 52 at 21-32. 
56 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 11. 
57 Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, “Annual Report 2009” at 27, online: Teachers, 
http://docs.otpp.com/AnnualReport.pdf: “We invest with a long-term focus because the pension plan will be paying 
benefits to today’s young teachers 70 years or more from now.” 
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being” as instructed by the Commission in YBM.58 In other words, it is not clear that the long-
term physical impacts of climate change require disclosure under the existing definition of 
material. 
With respect to regulatory risks, proposals to combat climate change are wide-ranging 
and include things that will save money in the long-term, such as improving the energy 
efficiency of buildings.59The biggest potential regulatory impact on issuers is the possibility of 
limits on GHG emissions and a corresponding increase in operating costs in order to comply. 
Such limits, however, do not appear likely in the near future. The current Canadian federal 
government has committed itself “to reducing Canada’s total greenhouse gas emissions by 17 per 
cent from 2005 levels by 2020” in accordance with the Copenhagen Accord, a non-binding 
international agreement.60 The government’s plan to meet this non-binding target makes no 
mention of caps on GHG emissions.61 The Conservative government’s previous climate change 
action plan, “Turning the Corner” appears to have been abandoned.62 One stated reason for 
holding off on imposing caps on GHG emissions is to ensure that Canada’s policies are aligned 
with the U.S. The U.S. Congress has failed to adopt federal GHG regulations,63 although many 
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62 “Canada’s Action on Climate Change”, supra note 60. 
63 Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, “Democrats Call Off Effort For Climate Bill in Senate”, New York Times, 
July 23, 2010 (QL). 
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states and municipalities have enacted their own initiatives.64 As a result of Congress’ failure, the 
E.P.A. will impose limits on GHG emissions to take effect starting in mid-2011,65 although the 
move is already being challenged in Congress and in the courts.66 The only North American 
companies currently subject to GHG emissions limits are large emitters operating in Alberta67 
and companies operating in the European Union, which put in place a cap-and-trade regime to 
meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.68 
The one step forward, two steps back on climate change legislation in North America has 
made it difficult for issuers to determine whether climate change regulation “constitutes a 
‘known trend’”69 that requires disclosure. The Conference Board of Canada has attributed the 
lack of disclosure on climate change at least partly to “a lack of clarity in federal regulations.”70 
With respect to the requirement to disclose the “financial and operational effects of 
environmental protection requirements” in the AIF, until regulation is imposed that puts a price 
on GHG emissions, any environmental costs of these emissions are “externalized” and do not 
have to be disclosed,71 precisely because they have no impact on the issuers’ financial results. 
B. The Remaining Gap in Climate Change-Related Disclosure 
Even assuming issuers are correctly assessing the materiality of the possible impacts of 
climate change to their future financial results, this may leave a gap in the information desired by 
some investors. Writing in the corporate governance context, Anand argues that requiring issuers 
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68 SEC Petition, supra note 1 at 22-23. 
69 Ibid. at 28. 
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71 Mary G Condon, Anita I Anand & Janis P Sarra, Securities Law in Canada: Cases & Commentary (Toronto: 
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to disclose which voluntary corporate governance mechanisms they have adopted and to explain 
why they have not adopted others means that investors do not have to draw inferences as to the 
reason for an issuer’s failure to incorporate a particular corporate governance mechanism.72 The 
problem with climate change-related disclosure under current securities law requirements is that 
the materiality threshold forces investors to draw inferences as to why a particular issuer has 
failed to make any climate change-related disclosure and, unlike corporate governance, there is 
no handy list of climate change best practices in order to impose a similar “comply or explain” 
rule. The materiality threshold in current mandatory disclosure rules means that if a company has 
determined that a risk is not “material” it is under no obligation to explain why it has come to this 
conclusion.73 Is it because, for example, the issuer has already taken action to reduce its GHG 
emissions or because it does not anticipate becoming the target of climate change regulation or 
because it has stockpiled cheap carbon credits or because it simply has not considered the 
issue?74 In sum, there is no obligation on an issuer that has failed to disclose any climate change-
related risks to make the statement “we do not consider climate change a material risk to our 
future financial results because we have already prepared for this risk in the following ways.”  
The materiality threshold may explain, therefore, the lack of climate change-related 
disclosure in many issuers’ continuous disclosure documents,75 but it does not necessarily follow 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Anita I Anand, “An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance: Structures Post-Sarbanes Oxley” 
(2006) 31 Del J Corp L 229 at 249. 
73 As Form 41-101F1 specifically states: “negative answers to items may be omitted”: see NI 41-101, supra note 12, 
General Instructions, Item (6). In the U.K., if information on environmental matters is not included in a directors’ 
report, the report must state that such information is not contained in the report, but there is no express requirement 
to explain why it is not: Companies Act, 2006, supra note 14, s. 417(5). 
74 Although this last possibility would constitute a breach of the issuers’ obligations regarding disclosure, it would 
be very difficult to detect and prove. An issuer might be required to disclose this type of information with respect to 
“reputation” risk: CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 10. But, like all of the other climate-change related 
risks, such disclosure would be necessary only if an issuer felt that its public image with respect to climate change 
was “material”. 
75 KPMG and United Nations Environment Programme, “Carrots and Sticks for Starters: Current Standards and 
Approaches in Voluntary and Mandatory Standards for Sustainability Reporting” (2006) at 8, online: KPMG 
<http://www.kpmg.com.au/Portals/0/Carrots_and_Sticksfinal.pdf> [KPMG, “Carrots”]. See also Steven Lydenberg, 
! *&!
that lowering or eliminating the materiality threshold with respect to information on issuer’s 
environmental performance is the best way to fill this gap.76 As Mahoney has noted, securities 
laws were “not designed to provide all value-relevant information to all market participants”77 
and “the more things a disclosure system attempts to do, the more substantial are the design 
problems facing its authors.”78 At some point, requiring disclosure of more information becomes 
counterproductive,79 and, post-Sarbanes-Oxley, companies are already disclosing more 
information than ever.80 The materiality threshold is an important guard against both information 
overload81 and “obscuring material disclosures with unnecessary disclosures of immaterial 
information.”82 
At the same time, increased environmental reporting should be improved environmental 
reporting that avoids the pitfalls of existing mandatory disclosure documents. In its 2008 review 
of issuers’ environmental reporting in continuous disclosure documents, the OSC noted that 
many of the issuers reviewed included only boilerplate discussion, even on company-specific 
matters, such as the issuer’s environmental policies.83 The next section of the paper examines 
whether voluntary disclosure mechanisms might fill, for now at least, the existing gap left by 
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76 See Case, supra note 9 at 410. For an argument in favour of expanded mandatory disclosure under securities 
regulation, see Cynthia A Williams, “The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency” (1999) 112 Harv L Rev 1197. 
77 Mahoney, supra note 27 at 1111.  
78 Ibid. at 1104. 
79 Troy A Paredes, “Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation” 
(2003), 81 Wash ULQ 417 at 419, 442, 446.  
80 Ibid. at 418. 
81 Ibid. at 448. 
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mandatory disclosure under securities regulation and evaluates disclosure under GRI’s G3 
Guidelines against the arguments in favour of mandatory disclosure. 
IV. FILLING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
A. The Global Reporting Initiative and Other Voluntary Disclosure Regimes 
In the aftermath of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska in 1989, the 
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres) came up with a corporate code of 
environmental conduct comprised of the ten Valdez Principles, later renamed the Ceres 
Principles.84 The tenth principle requires “an annual self-evaluation” of the company’s progress 
in implementing the principles, and also requires the company to “support the timely creation of 
generally accepted environmental audit processes”.85 To facilitate compliance with this principle, 
Ceres created an advisory panel to assist corporations that had endorsed the Ceres Principles 
report to investors in a “thorough and credible manner.”86 Between 1990 and 1999, the panel met 
regularly, defining and refining its reporting format.87 
In 1997, Ceres, in partnership with the United Nations (UN) Environment Programme, 
established the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), with the goal of extending the environmental 
reporting principles developed by Ceres to other social issues and to foster comparison of 
companies’ environmental performance by coming to a global consensus on reporting 
standards.88 In 1999, GRI’s “Sustainability Reporting Guidelines” for “triple bottom line” – 
economic, environmental and social – reporting were released. The Guidelines are now in their 
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86 Lydenberg, supra note 75 at 63. 
87 Ibid. 
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third generation, hence the name “G3 Guidelines”.89 In 2002, GRI was spun off from Ceres into 
an independent organization, and in 2006, GRI partnered with the UN Global Compact,90 a 
policy initiative with its own ten principles for corporate conduct in the areas of human rights, 
labour, environment and anti-corruption.91 The idea behind the partnership is for corporations to 
use the GRI reporting guidelines to report on their progress in achieving the Global Compact 
principles.92  
The G3 Guidelines contain Reporting Principles, such as stakeholder inclusiveness, 
balance and accuracy, “for defining report content and ensuring the quality of reported 
information” and “Standard Disclosures”, including numerous “Performance Indicators” for each 
of the three areas that make up the triple bottom line.93 The Guidelines also take into account that 
a company’s sustainability reporting will improve over time, and provide a ranking system for 
the level of compliance with the Guidelines to facilitate improvement.94 
With respect to climate change specifically, the G3 Guidelines require reporting of 
energy consumed and energy saved through conservation efforts and efficiency improvements, 
and GHGs emitted and GHG emission reductions planned and achieved, as well as total 
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environmental protection expenditures and investments.95 The G3 Guidelines also require 
disclosure on what it calls “Management Approach” items, including organizational 
responsibility, training and awareness and monitoring and follow-up.96 
Disclosure under the G3 Guidelines therefore helps to fill the gap left by the materiality 
threshold by allowing investors to see the company’s vulnerability to climate change impacts, 
through the disclosure of energy consumed and GHGs emitted; how the company plans to 
address this vulnerability, through disclosure of initiatives to reduce GHG emissions; and the 
progress made so far, through disclosure of energy saved and GHG emission reductions 
achieved. In other words, voluntary disclosure using the G3 Guidelines can reveal the why 
behind an issuer’s materiality determination, and permits to some extent an independent 
assessment of this determination by investors.    
Although the G3 Guidelines appear to be the “emerging standard” for reporting non-
financial information,97 they are just one set of voluntary disclosure standards a company could 
choose to follow. Specifically related to the issue of climate change is the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP). The guiding principle behind the CDP is that “a business can only manage what it 
measures.”98 To this end, the CDP, acting on behalf of 534 institutional investors,99 sends out an 
annual information request form to 4,700 large corporations around the world.100 The form asks 
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for data on direct and indirect GHG emissions, as well as information on physical and regulatory 
risks and opportunities.101 In 2010, 3050 companies responded to the request.102 CDP then 
compiles and analyzes the responses and provides the data and analysis to investors in the form 
of various reports. CDP also publishes a “Carbon Leadership Index” of the companies in each 
sector that provided the most comprehensive responses to the information request.103  
Also specific to climate change is the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure, 
released by a group of institutional investors, including CalPERS, in October 2006.104 The 
Framework consists of four elements of disclosure: total historical, current and projected GHG 
emissions; the company’s climate risk and emissions strategy; assessment of physical risks; and 
analysis of regulatory risks. These elements are to be applied through both current mandatory 
disclosure requirements and voluntary regimes such as GRI, thereby complementing existing 
disclosure requirements under securities law and other voluntary standards. 
The next two sections compare the advantages of mandatory versus voluntary 
environmental disclosure to determine whether voluntary disclosure might fill the gap left by 
disclosure made in accordance with the existing requirements under securities law. Given GRI’s 
position as the emerging standard, the analysis focuses primarily on GRI’s G3 Guidelines. I 
argue that disclosure in accordance with the GRI’s G3 Guidelines achieves many of the goals of 
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mandatory disclosure, such as comparability across companies and provides useful, credible 
information to investors.  
B. The Advantages of Mandatory Disclosure 
The primary advantage of mandatory disclosure is, not surprisingly, its mandatory nature: 
all issuers must disclose. Since voluntary disclosure standards “cannot compel adherence...there 
will be holdout problems.”105 Market pressure to voluntarily disclose will be insufficient “if a 
firm’s competitors choose not to disclose similar information.”106 Therefore, if a firm’s 
competitors are not disclosing their GHG emissions or climate change action plan, there is little 
incentive for a firm to be the first to do so.107 After all, why would corporate officials voluntarily 
take the risk of negative investor or consumer reaction to the disclosure? This may help to 
explain why participants in voluntary disclosure schemes tend to be firms that already have high 
environmental performance standards.108 
Take up of the GRI has in fact been limited. In 2010, the GRI was aware of 1,397 
companies who had issued sustainability reports using the G3 Guidelines.109 In 2008, the 
companies reporting in accordance with the G3 Guidelines included one third of S&P 100 
companies and 77% of the world’s 250 largest companies,110 but these numbers represent a very 
small percentage of all corporations worldwide and, in 2006, only 292 companies were reporting 
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in full compliance with the guidelines.111 The Board of the GRI itself has called on governments 
to make environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting mandatory.112 Making disclosure 
mandatory, however, does not necessarily mean that it will be complied with.113 France has 
experienced very low compliance rates with its mandatory social and environmental reporting 
requirements.114 As noted above, investors and regulators have expressed concern that North 
American issuers are not complying fully with existing environmental disclosure 
requirements.115 Companies may be more likely to comply with voluntary approaches when they 
are involved in developing the disclosure standards, since they are then more likely to view them 
as reasonable.116 As discussed further below, GRI develops its guidelines through extensive 
consultation with stakeholders.117 
There are also countervailing forces to the disinclination to disclose, although there is 
likely a limit to what these forces can achieve absent mandatory disclosure rules.118 If investors 
continue to demand more and better climate change-related disclosure, issuers may choose to 
respond to that demand without the need for mandatory disclosure rules.119 Institutional investors 
are playing an important role in this regard. As mentioned above, CDP collects information on 
behalf of 534 institutional investors, representing $64 trillion in assets120 and the Global 
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Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure is an institutional investor initiative.121 Under the 
Investor Network on Climate Risk Action Plan, another initiative of Ceres, investors representing 
$1.75 trillion in assets under management122 have pledged to “urge companies to provide better 
disclosure about the financial and material risks posed by climate change and to explain how 
they are factoring carbon costs into operational and capital-planning decisions” using the GRI 
guidelines and the Global Framework on Climate Risk Disclosure.123 Some institutional 
investors, including the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, are voting in favour of 
shareholder proposals asking for better environmental disclosure.124 Investor interest should also 
encourage analysts to provide analysis of environmental factors. The question is whether 
investors’ recent focus on environmental issues will shift during times of economic crises, such 
as the ongoing sovereign debt crises affecting the United States and the European Union. 
Although leaving it up to issuers to judge the demand for climate change-related 
disclosure may slow take-up of voluntary disclosure standards like the G3 Guidelines, it also 
allows issuers to determine whether additional non-material disclosure is worth the expense or 
whether these resources would be better spent implementing other environmental initiatives.125 
Since disclosure is not costless, it is important to determine whether it will have a sufficient 
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effect on investor and company behaviour to justify directing resources to disclosure over other 
possible forms of environmental regulation.126   
Another important touted advantage of mandatory disclosure rules is that they ensure 
“that information will be conveyed to investors in a standardized manner”,127 thereby facilitating 
comparison of companies128 and enhancing credibility.129 The correlative criticism of voluntary 
disclosure in general and sustainability reports in particular is that they do not provide the 
standardized, credible disclosure on climate change necessary for investors to make meaningful 
comparisons.130 
The G3 Guidelines seek to address the problems of standardization and comparability by 
providing a standard format and set of indicators for companies to use in disclosing 
environmental performance information to investors. An investor is therefore able to compare 
companies adhering to the G3 Guidelines, since they will be providing the same information in 
the same format. The specificity of the information requested under the G3 Guidelines also 
facilitates comparison.131  
A related criticism of voluntary disclosure is that it fails to provide clear “benchmarks” 
by which to measure an issuer’s performance against both other issuers and that issuer’s own 
performance in previous years.132 The G3 Guidelines, however, provide benchmarks in the form 
of reporting of total emissions of GHGs, ozone-depleting substances, NOX, SO2 and “other 
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significant air emissions” by weight.133 The G3 Guidelines also provide a standard for disclosure 
against which to measure non-G3 Guidelines environmental reporting. 
The credibility problem is particularly relevant to company “sustainability reports”, 
which are often viewed as mere “public relations” exercises that tend to focus on opportunities, 
rather than risks.134 This perception is reinforced when sustainability reports are issued in 
response to negative publicity about a company’s environmental performance.135 It would seem, 
however, that having gone to the expense of producing a sustainability report, an issuer would 
want to signal its credibility to investors. Although mandatory disclosure rules backed by 
penalties for misrepresentation are one way of providing credibility, adherence to a set of 
voluntary disclosure standards, like the G3 Guidelines, can also serve this function.136 First, full 
compliance with the standard demonstrates that the company is not making selective “self-
serving” disclosures.137 Second, specific aspects of voluntary disclosure standards can assist in 
ensuring credibility. The G3 Guidelines’ “Management Approach” items enhance credibility 
through disclosure of “credibility-boosting” indicators, such as the monitoring and follow-up 
measures implemented to support any lofty goals.138 Although the CDP does not verify the 
accuracy of responses, the information request form includes questions regarding “sources of 
uncertainty” in the data provided, such as assumptions or extrapolations made in calculating the 
quantity of GHG emissions.139 Third, the information provided through the G3 Guidelines’ 
specific input and output “indicators” on, for example, the amount of a company’s GHG 
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emissions, are “less susceptible to manipulation and [are] more immune to economic pressures” 
than reporting requirements based on broad concepts of corporate social responsibility.140 
Credibility also can be enhanced through auditing, or by including environmental reporting with 
financial reporting in the annual report.141 The credibility concern can also counter the 
disincentive to disclose negative information,142 since disclosing bad news may help to ensure 
that the good news is not discounted as being incomplete.143 
Finally, mandatory disclosure also provides an answer to the “free-rider” problem that 
arises from the “public good” component of disclosure. This problem has two aspects: the 
impossibility of issuers recouping the cost of developing a disclosure format from other issuers 
who will be able to use it144 and the difficulty of analysts in recouping the full value of time 
spent gathering information.145 Non-profit organizations, such as GRI and the CDP, can provide 
a solution to this problem, however: they are not concerned, as private companies or analysts 
would be, about going to the expense of developing a disclosure format only to have other 
companies “free-ride” and simply copy it146 or not being able to recover the full cost of gathering 
information from the investors who will make use of it. Growing investor interest in this 
information should ensure that these organizations continue to have funding to engage in 
standards development and information gathering. 
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B. The Advantages of the Voluntary Disclosure under the G3 Guidelines 
Apart from the low take-up rates of the GRI’s G3 Guidelines among issuers, the 
Guidelines would seem to achieve several of the advantages of mandatory disclosure, including 
standardization, comparability and credibility. Use of voluntary disclosure standards such as the 
G3 Guidelines also has its own advantages, including allowing greater room for innovation, 
collaboration and flexibility, and providing “green” companies with an effective way to 
distinguish themselves from “dirty” ones. 
The “proliferation of single issue disclosure initiatives”,147 such as the CDP, may impede 
the move towards standardization, but it also helps to ensure that voluntary disclosure standards 
continue to evolve and improve.148 Ongoing refinement of the G3 Guidelines ensures that 
disclosure in accordance with this standard continues to reflect the information investors actually 
want.149 The goal is to maintain the right balance between innovation and standardization.150 
This is an advantage that voluntary disclosure has over mandatory disclosure, since writing 
disclosure rules into law effectively stops the innovation process.151 There also is a significant 
amount of consultation among the different climate change disclosure initiatives. For example, 
the CDP and Ceres both sit on the World Economic Forum’s Climate Disclosure Standards 
Board, another organization working towards the development of a standard framework for 
climate change-related disclosure.152 Continuing innovation also allows for ongoing consultation 
with various stakeholders in order to come to a true consensus on the appropriate level and 
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content of reporting.153 GRI uses an “open process” of collaboration with business, civil society, 
labour and “other professional institutions” to develop its reporting standards.154  
The other advantage of a voluntary approach to climate change disclosure is that even as 
it moves towards standardization, it maintains flexibility.155 The GRI/Global Compact guidance 
document notes that there is no “single way to prepare a sustainability report”, but “encourages” 
companies to use the GRI G3 Guidelines.156 Climate change-related disclosure, in particular, is 
not amenable to a “one size fits all” approach. Climate change will impact different companies 
very differently, as will regulation of GHG emissions. A mandatory disclosure rule could result 
in the disclosure of irrelevant, or vague, boilerplate, information by many issuers.157 Flexibility 
also allows smaller companies to tailor their disclosure as needed.158 Current mandatory 
disclosure requirements under securities law are frequently criticized for placing too heavy a 
burden on smaller companies, effectively precluding them from the public markets.159 This is 
one reason why North American regulators might want to wait and observe companies’ 
experience using the G3 Guidelines for small and medium-sized companies.  
Another advantage of single-issue voluntary disclosure schemes is that they are tailored 
to a specific area in which some investors might be particularly interested. Voluntary disclosure 
on a specific issue, such as climate change, allows interested investors to save time by accessing 
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efficiently the information that matters to them, rather than having to spend time searching 
through mandatory continuous disclosure documents.160 Investors may find “comprehensive 
reports” “daunting” or “boring”.161 Disclosure focused on a single issue, such as that made in 
response to the CDP information request, hopefully avoids the “information overload” problem 
for investors and experts alike.162 
Finally, voluntary disclosure allows “good” or “green” companies to distinguish 
themselves from “bad” or “dirty” ones. By choosing to disclose environmental information in 
accordance with a voluntary standard such as GRI, a company can signal its commitment to 
environmental issues. This is similar to the way a company can signal its value by listing its 
shares on a publicly-traded stock exchange, thereby “voluntarily” agreeing to be bound by 
mandatory disclosure rules in securities legislation.163 In order for signalling to be effective, 
however, it has to be difficult for bad companies to mimic.164 The G3 Guidelines ranking system 
for the level of compliance with the standard and the CDP’s Carbon Leadership Index meet this 
requirement of an effective signalling device by providing an objective indicator of the quality of 
the issuer’s voluntary disclosure.165  
V. CONCLUSION 
! Although there is some evidence that the information desired by the “reasonable” 
investor is shifting to include information on the long-term effects of climate change, this 
information, in the case of many issuers, has yet to reach the point of “materiality” under existing 
securities law. Even if all issuers were in full compliance with their obligations to disclose 
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climate change-related risks under current mandatory securities disclosure rules, the materiality 
threshold means that a gap would remain between what issuers are mandated to disclose and the 
level of detailed information desired by some investors. Voluntary disclosure initiatives such as 
The Global Reporting Initiative’s G3 Guidelines are helping to fill this gap by providing more 
comprehensive, specific and detailed climate-change related disclosure in a standardized manner. 
I do not wish to paint an overly rosy picture of voluntary disclosure – take-up of the G3 
Guidelines remains low, for example – but the existence of an emerging global standard for 
voluntary climate change-related disclosure helps to achieve the comparability and credibility of 
mandatory disclosure and encouragement from institutional investors and other organizations 
could help to boost use of the G3 Guidelines and other voluntary disclosure standards. The GRI’s 
G3 Guidelines also provide an example of an environmental disclosure standard, one regulators 
would do well to study more carefully before expanding existing disclosure requirements in 
order to ensure that the information disclosed by issuers is in fact useful to investors and not 
more unhelpful, boilerplate statements. 
 
